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1. Introduction
Linda Nochlin writes in her famous essay, “[t]here are no women equivalents of Michelan-
gelo or Rembrandt, Delacroix or Cezanne, Picasso or Matisse, or even, in very recent
times, for de Kooning or Warhol” (Nochlin, 1988, p.150). Indeed, if one looks at the
catalogues of the most prominent museums, one will not find many (if any) female artists
before the beginning of the 20th century. Such inequality rarely arises due to the lower
quality of the female’s work, but, as many experts point out, due to the stereotypical
historically established image of the artist as a white male: “Male artists are overrep-
resented in major galleries because still in 2016 the archetypal artist is a white male”
(D’Souza (2016) quoting Melbourne artist Elvis Richardson). Historical gender dispar-
ities in art also reflect a broader tendency in the society, with total male dominance in
politics, economics, and culture. For a long time, females did not have an access to the
same education and training as males, including art education. Despite this, there were
some quite prominent female artists almost at all times; however, their names got lost
in history. “Like those of her male contemporaries, Plautilla Nelli’s Biblical paintings
were masterful works of beauty, but, in a tale as old as patriarchy itself, she was written
out of every Renaissance history book, dismissed as just another nun with a paintbrush.”
(Ellis-Petersen, 2017). Some museums are trying to restore the historical justice, which
resulted in several exhibitions showing forgotten talented females to the public1.
Nowadays, more and more female artists are present in the galleries, and the differ-
ences in the gender representations are not as dramatic as it used to be. Equal rights
and feminist movements affected the strength of the gender gaps; however, it has not yet
fully disappeared. According to the data gathered by Maura Reilly (Reilly, 2015), even
with almost equal numbers of art school graduates of both genders, the gender distri-
bution in the galleries and at the exhibitions are far from equal. For instance, two big
modern art galleries in Berlin, the Berlinische Galerie and the Hamburger Bahnhof had
1Among them, for example, are long-awaited and postponed due to COVID-19 exhibition of Artemisia
Gentileschi in National Gallery; a very successful 2019 exhibition “City of Women: Female Artists in
Vienna from 1900 to 1938” in Viennese Belvedere; 2019-2020 exhibition of two Renaissance artists “A
Tale of Two Women Painters: Sofonisba Anguissola and Lavinia Fontana” at the Prado Museum in
Madrid.
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only around 25% of solo female exhibitions in 2007-2014. This trend is persistent for
many developed countries; for example, according to the Australian survey The Countess
report2, in 2014, there were 74% female visual art graduates and only 34% of females
in museum exhibitions. One explanation for this is given by Polonsky (2019), suggest-
ing that the galleries and museums are choosing the safe strategies of program selection.
Aiming to attract more visitors to their institutions, directors and curators keep selecting
artists already known to a broad audience, and these artists are mainly male. Thus, such
a ‘safe’ behaviour of art institutions may support the continuing gender disparities in the
art market.
Despite the considerable amount of studies dealing with the specifics of the artists’
labour market (see Bille, 2020, for a recent survey), and although the gender wage gap
is a well-established field of research in labour economics, only a few discuss potential
gender inequalities in revenues from the art market.
There are some papers using data from secondary markets to explore gender differences
in auction outcomes. Resale prices do not directly affect artists’ income but can be
interpreted as the buyer’s (sometimes retrospective) valuation of the artistic product
(Bocart et al., 2020). Combining primary (gallery) market data with global auction data,
Bocart et al. (2020) find that women in their sample of Western artists are, on balance, 2.3
percentage points less likely to transition from primary to secondary art markets for fine
art. However, conditioning upon transition to secondary markets, artworks associated
with female artists realise a premium of 4.4%. The authors provide further evidence
that this result is driven by a small number of now popular and, therefore, high-selling
individuals. A similar effect is observed by Cameron et al. (2019), who look at Yale
graduates and their performance on the art market. While there are fewer auctions sales
for women than for men, prices for female artists’ artworks tend to be higher. On the
contrary, Adams et al. (2017) find that, depending on the type of controls involved, auction
prices for paintings made by women are 12 to 25 % below those of paintings made by men.
Finally, Farrell et al. (2020) document that secondary art market prices are around 18%
2http://www.thecountessreport.com.au/
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higher for women than men in their sample of Indigenous Australian art auctions. Yet,
the market for this kind of art is characterised by an extraordinarily high share of women
among the top-selling artists (which is probably due to the higher cultural authenticity
traditionally ascribed to female painters as the authors point out).
We are aware of only two studies dealing with gender inequalities in artists’ direct
income. Rengers and Velthuis (2002), who use data on Dutch gallery prices, report
that works of visual art made by women are sold at a lower price compared to men.
Controlling for artists, galleries, and artwork attributes, they find an unexplained gender
gap of around 140 Euros (given a mean price of 2,227 Euros per item). The only study
concerned with aggregated income data is Heo and Yoon (2018). Analysing Korean survey
data on wages, the authors find a gender wage gap in the industry segment called ‘Arts and
culture’ of around 16%, which is unexplained by characteristics such as age, education,
and experience. Furthermore, they show that this unexplained part of the gap increases
over wage quantiles.
Our paper analyses the incomes of German artists to test the presence of the pay gap.
Previous studies either rely on highly selective samples, chiefly from the top end of the
distribution of earnings or, like in Bille and Jensen (2018), do not provide a clear account
of revenues. However, as, e.g., Bille et al. (2017) point out, the art market is skewed, and
there exists a selective group of highly performing superstar artists and a much bigger
group of poorer, often unemployed trained artists. Using a more diverse sample of artists,
we provide a more comprehensive picture of the gender differences in the art labour market
as a whole. We are able to distinguish between the art income and other sources of income
and find suggestive evidence that the art market is indeed discriminating against female
artists. Specifically, the empirical analysis indicates that gender itself is a predictor of art
market revenues and that women are about ten percentage points less likely to belong to
the top category over three years. Only 30 to 40 percent of these gaps can be explained
by differences in characteristics. These results are robust for different art forms.
We are also exploring the possibility that such income differences occur due to the
networking behaviour specific for each gender. We indeed find some differences: females
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tend to connect more and be involved in the broader community, whereas males focus
on creating tighter links. This evidence suggests that male behaviour might be more
important for success in the art market. However, no causal evidence is possible with the
data on hand.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of
economic theories about discrimination with application to the art market. Section 3
describes the data set, whereas Section 4 presents the empirical strategy and the results.
Finally, Section 5 concludes with a discussion.
2. Theories about discrimination
In their handbook article, Altonji and Blank (1999) refer to two main models of discrim-
ination in labour markets. First, in the most prominent within the series of taste-based
models proposed by Becker (1971), the preference for workers from their own group enters
the employer’s utility function in the form of additional costs besides the wage when hiring
a worker outside this group.3 In equilibrium, the pay gap between the groups exists if the
parameter accounting for these additional costs exceeds a critical value. After the critical
value has been reached, the gap increases in the distaste parameter and in the number of
employers with in-group preferences.
Bertrand (2011) notes that the taste-based model was developed to explain discrimina-
tion against non-white employees and is not directly applicable to discrimination against
women. Therefore, she advocates using the identity model proposed by Akerlof and
Kranton (2000) as a micro-foundation for the taste-based model. In the identity model,
deviation from the ‘assigned category’ decreases utility. In work environments perceived
as male, female co-workers may threaten the gender identity of men. Further variants of
the taste-based model relate to discriminating co-workers and customers. In the latter
case, the assumption is that buyers receive lower utility from purchasing services that
involve interaction with individuals outside the in-group.
3As noticed by Altonji and Blank (1999), there is a (formal) similarity to the standard hedonic wage
model.
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Second, statistical discrimination models (starting with the pioneering works by Phelps
(1972) and Arrow (1973)) focus on personal characteristics in the hiring and wage-setting
process. In the context of information asymmetry, employers may use aggregate group
characteristics as a predictor for productivity. As a result, equally skilled individuals
are treated differently. In the case of labour market discrimination against women, long-
standing stereotypes and prejudices, such as a lower job attachment and a higher number
of absences, may cause gender inequalities.
Concerning the art market, there is empirical evidence for disparities in revenues
between male and female artists (e.g., Alper and Wassall, 2006). However, income dispar-
ities alone cannot be taken as proof for direct discrimination by market players as there
might be differences in observable variables within the groups. For instance, arguing upon
a series of historical examples rather than systematic data analyses, Tyler Cowen points
out that differences in access to resources like arts education, training networks, and ex-
pensive material as well as maternal obstacles (discussed as the ‘motherhood penalty’ in
labour economics) are the most convincing reasons for female underachievement in the art
market (Cowen, 1996). Being more radical and ignoring these kinds of barriers, German
painter Georg Baselitz states that “[t]he market doesn’t lie. [...] If women are ambitious
enough to succeed, they can do so” (Connolly, 2015).
If we were able to control for differences in observables across the groups, such as
education, artistic excellence, and family, and gender was still a predictor for revenues,
discriminating behaviour of players in the art market would be an obvious explanation for
this result. In a market with high uncertainty about quality and artist ability, statistical
discrimination models can explain why players (e.g., dealers, auction houses, curators,
experts, and journalists) may take gender as a proxy for quality.4 In the same manner,
Becker’s consumer discrimination model could be applied to collectors with a preference
for male artists’ works.
4In their conceptual framework, Bocart et al. (2020) argue that the variant of the statistical discrim-
ination model developed by Phelps (1972) is more applicable to the current state of the art market given
that we cannot observe an underinvestment in education by women in anticipation of discrimination as
predicted by Arrow (1973) model.
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3. The data set
The study is based on cross-sectional data from a self-administered survey conducted by
the Bund Bildender Künstlerinnen und Künstler (BKK, national association of visual
artists), a professional representation of free-lance visual artists in Germany. From March
to May 2016, the questionnaire was part of the association’s journal given to the more than
10,000 members (claimed by the BKK) and distributed to the fifteen BKK regional asso-
ciations and other artists’ organisations. Additionally, it was posted on the association’s
website.5
In total, there were 1,585 responses, of which 1,361 were coded as ‘completed’. 94.87%
declared to be a member of an artist association (BKK: 80.63%). According to Bertschek
et al. (2017), the number of core workers in the German art market is 18,045 in 2016,
with 1,795 individuals categorised as ‘own-account visual artists’. With characteristics for
gender, age, and income similar to those of official data provided by the German Federal
Statistical Office and the German artists’ social security fund (Künstlersozialkasse), we
expect our sample to be representative.6
As a special feature, the data includes information on whether the subject is recognised
by tax authorities as an artist (which applies to 85.33% of all observations in our sample).
Recognition requires proof of free artists’ work in terms of education, press releases,
exhibitions, and prizes. In case of doubt, an advisory body is involved in the decision-
making process. This information is helpful as the analyses based on population-wide
panel data typically work with very broad categories such as ‘photographer’ or ‘painter’.
In the survey, artists report their yearly revenues from the art market for three previous
years (2013 to 2015). This income is divided into eight categories, see Figure 1. With
category 3 (yearly revenues between 3,000 and 5,000 Euros) being the median category,
our data reflects previous findings indicating that artists rely on different income sources
(see Bille, 2020, for an overview). In fact, 78.82% declare to have income from other
sources such as non-art jobs, patrons, partner and family, and unemployment benefits.
5See the official documentation in Priller (2016) for further information on the data set.
6A summary of these data can be found in Schulz et al. (2016).
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(c) Revenues from the art market in 2015
category 1: no revenues
category 2: x ≤ 1000
category 3: 1, 000 < x ≤ 3, 000
category 4: 3, 000 < x ≤ 5, 000
category 5: 5, 000 < x ≤ 10, 000
category 6: 10, 000 < x ≤ 20, 000
category 7: 20, 000 < x ≤ 50, 000
category 8: more than 50, 000 [EUROs]
56.96% state that they are engaged in art-related teaching activities.
Figure 1 also shows that, compared to male artists, the female artists’ share is always
lower in the three top income categories but higher in the three lowest categories following
category 1. Additionally, Pearson’s chi-squared test rejects the null hypothesis of inde-
pendence for each year (p-value = 0.000). Yet, it might be the case that these gender
differences result from differences in characteristics that are crucial for art market success.
We will consider this in the empirical analysis.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. Note
that topcatinc is a binary variable equal to 1 if the artist is in the top income category for
all years 2013 to 2016, and zero otherwise. The Table suggests that female artists appear
to be slightly better educated, whereas male artists are, on average, more successful in
terms of art prizes. There are also gender differences with respect to partnership and
children.
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Moreover, the artist’s age (not shown in the Table) is divided into six categories, where
the median category refers to those artists between fifty and sixty years old. Women
in our sample are younger than men (χ2 = 50.3111, p-value = 0.000). In the same
way, experience with exhibitions is categorised. Male artists show more experience in
single exhibitions, whereas the null is slightly rejected for group exhibitions (two-sample
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, p-values = 0.0000 and 0.060).
Table 1: Summary statistics
N Mean Min Max
demographics
female - 1,354 0.561 0 1
children
♂ 595 0.699 0 1
♀ 758 0.619 0 1
partnership
♂ 591 0.786 0 1
♀ 751 0.675 0 1
education
art academy
♂ 595 0.570 0 1
♀ 759 0.563 0 1
art school
♂ 595 0.245 0 1
♀ 759 0.300 0 1
in education
♂ 595 0.010 0 1
♀ 759 0.011 0 1
autodidact
♂ 595 0.271 0 1
♀ 759 0.221 0 1
non-art ♂ 572 0.468 0 1
education ♀ 714 0.482 0 1
art market
recognised ♂ 562 0.849 0 1
(by tax authorities) ♀ 712 0.859 0 1
public grants
♂ 589 0.348 0 1
♀ 752 0.358 0 1
art prizes
♂ 585 0.487 0 1
♀ 747 0.427 0 1
own studio
♂ 590 0.870 0 1
♀ 755 0.845 0 1
topcatinc
♂ 595 0.213 0 1
♀ 759 0.092 0 1
Mean pairs difference: bold p < 0.05
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4. Empirical analyses and results
Figure 1 in the previous section already hints at significant gender differences related to
revenues from the art market. Given these distributions, it may seem tempting to assume
discrimination. However, we cannot rule out that these revenue gaps can be explained by
group differences in productivity characteristics, such as education, work experience, and
artistic excellence. In addition, different preferences regarding the field of art and family
status may play a role.
For this reason, and because of the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, we use an
ordered logit model defined by the following equation:
Y ∗i = β1female+ β
′Xij + εi, (1)
where i refers to the individual, Y ∗i is the (latent) income variable, female denotes the
gender dummy, Xi is a set of control variables, and εi is a random term. Our control
variables include demographics (age, partnership, children), location (federal state, type
of area, abroad), education (type of secondary school, type of art school), field of art
(14 categories, see Figure B.1 in Appendix B), and artistic excellence (proxied by prizes,
exhibitions, having or sharing a studio, and public grants).
Since Yi = j if αj−1 < Y
∗
1 ≤ αj (for j = 1, ..., 8), the probability of observing income
category j as an outcome for i equals the probability that the estimated linear function
(1) is within the range of the thresholds (denoted by α) estimated for that category:
Pr (Yi = j) = Pr (αj−1 < Y
∗
1 ≤ αj)
= Pr (αj−1 < β1female+ β
′Xij + εi ≤ αj) . (2)
Hence, the estimated β1 being significantly different from zero would indicate a gender
gap in art market revenues (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010).
Note that we refrain from using the information on the partner’s financial support as a
predictor for the art market income level. While it might be the case that these kinds of
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subsidies reduce art market activities, which in turn results in lower revenues, the reverse
implication could also hold. That is, artists with lower revenues from the art market rely
more heavily on other income sources. The fact that the partner’s financial support does
not correlate negatively with art market activities proxied by the number of exhibitions
suggests that the second line of argument is more likely to be true (correlation coefficients:
0.067 (2013, p-value = 0.030), 0.059 (2014, p-value = 0.059), and 0.040 (2015, p-value =
0.201).
Main results
Figure 2 plots the average marginal effects of the estimating model (1) for male and female
artists. There is clear evidence that female artists are less likely to be in higher-income
classes and more likely to be in lower-income classes. In addition, Table 2 indicates that,
conditional on a comprehensive set of controls, the (latent) income variable is negatively
associated with the female dummy variable. For women, we have a decrease in the log odds
of being in a higher level of revenues between 0.34 and 0.47, holding all other variables
constant. Table A.1 in Appendix A reports predicted probabilities by year and gender.
Moreover, since previous literature has identified the motherhood penalty as an important
driver of the gender pay gap (e.g., Blau and Kahn, 2017), we additionally estimate model
(1) for a restricted sample of artists without children below the age of 14. Table A.2 in
Appendix A indicates that the estimates of β1 are similar to those presented in Table 2.
Returning to Table 2, we see that our artistic excellence measures, such as art prizes,
exhibitions, and having a studio, positively impact art market income, whereas art edu-
cation does not seem to play a role. This result is in line with Bille and Jensen (2018)
who find that formal artistic education seems not to affect the probability of staying in
the artistic labour market for visual artists in their sample of Danish artists.
Does this also imply that men are more likely to stay in the top income category, i.e., to
constantly make a living as an artist? To answer this question, we estimate a model quite
similar to (1) but with topinc as the dependent variable. topinc is a binary variable equal
to 1 if the artists are in the top income category in years 2013 to 2016, and zero otherwise.
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Figure 2: Income categories and gender – average marginal effects
-.05 0 .05 .1
Average marginal effects
cat 1 cat 2 cat 3 cat 4 cat 5 cat 6 cat 7 cat 8
(a) 2013
-.05 0 .05 .1
Average marginal effects
cat 1 cat 2 cat 3 cat 4 cat 5 cat 6 cat 7 cat 8
(b) 2014
-.04 -.02 0 .02 .04 .06
Average marginal effects
cat 1 cat 2 cat 3 cat 4 cat 5 cat 6 cat 7 cat 8
(c) 2015
category 1: no income
category 2: less than 1000
category 3: 1, 000 < x ≤ 3, 000
category 4: 3, 000 < x ≤ 5, 000
category 5: 5, 000 < x ≤ 10, 000
category 6: 10, 000 < x ≤ 20, 000
category 7: 20, 000 < x ≤ 50, 000
category 8: more than 50, 000 [EURO]
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The coefficients are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) and Probit regressions.
Table 3 indicates that female artists are around ten percentage points (40.47% of the
pooled topcatinc mean of 0.252) less likely to stay in the top income category for the
whole period under study.
Finally, we use the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for nonlinear regression models as
proposed by Sinning et al. (2008) (Stata command nldecompose) to determine the extent
to which observable characteristics contribute to the gender gaps in revenues from the art
market. It shows that differences in demographics, education, location, artistic excellence,
and art forms account for 40.15% (in 2013), 31.44% (in 2014), and 37.36% (in 2015) of
the unconditional disparity in income classes. Regarding the probability of staying in the
top income category, these group differences explain 35.91% of the gender gap.
As a consequence of the inequalities in art market revenues, we find that female artists
are more engaged in teaching the arts (females: 55.51%, males: 44.42%) and have higher
earnings from it (Pearson’s chi-squared test reject the null hypothesis of independence for
each year, p-values: 0.000, 0.014, 0.000). Besides, more female than male artists declare
to be supported by their partners (females: 68.18%, males: 34.09%).
Female artists sell fewer works on the primary market. Differences in revenues could
result from different prices and/or different quantities. We do not have information about
prices, but subjects were asked about the number of works they sold during the years
2013 to 2015 at exhibitions: (1) none, (2) up to three, (3) up to six, (4) up to ten, (5) up
to 15, (6) more than 15. From this, we created the variable workssold.
Table A.4 in Appendix A reports results from ordered logistic regressions with the
same set of covariates but with workssold as the dependent variable. The estimated β1
is significantly different from zero and negative, indicating that female artists sell less to
the art market than male artists. Figure B.2 in Appendix B illustrates that women are
45.64% and 23.80% more likely to be in the two lowest categories of sellings but 12.38%,
15.17%, and 39.63% less likely to be in the three highest categories. We hence cannot
rule out that there are discriminating buyers on the primary art market. In other words,
these results make a case for the taste-based model of discrimination.
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Old versus young artists: the role of experience As discussed in Section 2, the art
market is characterised by a high degree of uncertainty about quality and the artist’s
ability, which opens the door for behaviour described by statistical discrimination models.
Artists, therefore, may look for ways to signal quality to the market and to develop a
reputation so that players update prior beliefs. Early career artists, however, have fewer
opportunities to signal quality.
To examine the effect of reputation and experience on gender disparities in revenues
from the art market, we split the sample along the median category of age and reestimate
model (1) for both groups.7 Figure 3 presents estimates of β1 for both groups across
the years. It shows that the gender gap is more pronounced for younger than for older
artists. Since bootstrap and permutation tests reveal that the difference in coefficients
between the groups is not always significant at the 5% level (p-values of 0.096 (2013), 0.112
(2014), and 0.032 (2015)), we refer to these results as suggestive evidence in support of
the hypothesis of statistical discrimination against female artists.







-1.5 -1 -.5 0
age ≥ 50 years age < 50 years
7Note that Rengers and Velthuis (2002) also document a mean artist age of 50.03 years in their sample
of works created visual artists in the Netherlands. They conclude that “... it takes a long time before an
artist starts selling on the private market” (p.6).
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Non-discrimination by the public sector. Next, we want to contrast our previous res-
ults with areas where we expect little or no discriminating behaviour. We look at the
public sector’s behaviour regarding the purchases of art and recognition of the artists.
Private buyers usually seek artworks that can serve as a profitable investment, whereas
the public sector looks at many other factors when deciding to acquire the art piece or
choosing the artist to order the specific piece from. For example, the public sector might
be aiming to encourage and support underrepresented on the private market artists, in-
cluding female artists.8 First, we find no gender difference with regard to recognition by
tax authorities (females: 85.96%, males: 84.88%, p-value = 0.631 (Fisher’s exact test)).
As explained in the foregoing section, the recognition requires proofs of free artists’ work
and can involve the call for a ‘jury’. The fact that we do not observe a gender gap even
in the raw data suggests that there are, on average, no systematic differences among men
and women in our sample concerning qualifications required to be recognised as an artist.
Second, we examine whether female artists are disadvantaged in terms of public acquis-
itions. Therefore, we reestimate the model (1) with public acquisition as the dependent
variable. public acquisition equals 1 if the artist affirms the questions “Were there any
public acquisitions in 2013/2014/2015” at least for one year, and zero otherwise. Table 4
shows that once we control for observable characteristics, the estimated coefficient of the
gender dummy is statistically not different from zero.
In sum, we interpret these results as an indication that we cannot rule out discrimination
to be a driver of our main findings presented in Table 2.
Does art form matter? The dataset contains the artists working with different art forms
or with several art forms: paintings, sculpture, graphics, etc. We explore the gender pay
gap further by looking at the most popular art forms in our sample: paintings, sculptures,
and objects.
Figure B.1 in Appendix B shows the gender distribution for different art forms. The
8This incentive follows the general anti-discrimination trend and laws on the labour market in many
Western countries and in Germany in particular. Regarding cultural sponsorship by the public sector
(which remains with the federal states in Germany), the Kulturfördergesetz of North Rhine-Westphalia,
for example, emphasises the equal treatment for men and women (MKFFI NRW, 2014, p.67)).
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distribution of art forms for both genders is quite similar, with some art forms being more
prevalent among males and some among females. Printmaking is actually the third most
popular art form for males. It has almost as many male artists as object art (173 and 172
correspondingly), but object art is much more prevalent among females. Hence, object
art was chosen as the third art form for analysis.
First, Figure B.3 in Appendix B presents estimates of β1 from model (1) for the five
most quoted art forms in our sample. It shows, for instance, that β̂1 is the greatest for
photography and the smallest for object art.
Second, Table A.3 in Appendix A illustrates the gender differences in probabilities to
be in top categories for artists working with the three most popular art forms. Due to
the limited data, we are not able to analyse the probability of staying in top income
categories in all three years, as we did for the full sample. For example, we only observe
41 sculptors constantly staying in top income categories. Moreover, only nine of them are
females. Therefore, we are looking at the probabilities to be in top income categories at
least in one of the years. All three most represented art forms show an around 10% lower
probability for females to end up in the top income category. So it seems that the gender
pay gap persists regardless of the art form in which the artist predominantly works.
Do networks help? As Bille and Jensen (2018) claimed, networks could be playing an
important role in performance on the market by increasing visibility and recognition of
the artist. In this section, we are testing potential differences in gender behaviour towards
network creation. McDowell et al. (2006) suggest the existence of gender differences in
scientific co-authorship; however, the difference is diminishing with more people entering
the profession. In recent experimental work, Mengel (2020) finds that gender gaps in
performance do not appear because of the differences in the network formation but can
be partly explained with the network tightness and behaviour, with men more likely
spreading the rewards across the network to the peers of the same gender.
The data on hand does not report the exact network; however, we have some indicat-
ors of networking and collaborative activities, such as participation in joint exhibitions,
memberships in formal artistic organisations, and/or sharing atelier.
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First, we look at the difference in group exhibitions. Conditional on the educational,
demographics, art form, location controls, as well as on the number of solo exhibitions,
females tend to participate in more group exhibitions: the ordered log odd of being in
the higher category by the number of group exhibitions is almost 0.5 higher for females
than for males (see Table 5 for the results). One worry could be that higher levels of
participation in group exhibitions may signal less recognition of female artists, resulting
in lower solo exhibition level (as also reported in Reilly, 2015). However, controlling for
the number of solo exhibitions allows us to look at the group exhibitions as a proxy of
network links, rather than the sign of professional recognition.
Similarly, we find women tend to join more art organisations than men. These two
results suggest that the networks’ size is not playing an important role in explaining the
gender gap in the art labour market. Other things equal, females are engaging more in
interactions with colleagues. Moreover, females are putting greater importance on having
colleagues nearby (see Table A.5 in Appendix A.). They are ten percentage points more
likely to consider colleagues nearby to be essential for their artistic carrier. However, as
we showed in the main results, these engagements and beliefs are not resulting in higher
performances in the art market.
Sharing the atelier is, however, slightly more common among males, as presented in
Table 6. Working in the same atelier represents a different relationship than participation
in group exhibitions or formal art organisations. One would expect a much tighter link
between the artists working in the same atelier. So, while females tend to connect and
engage more, males create more stable and close relationships that are potentially bringing
more benefits in the future. Such a conclusion goes in line with Mengel (2020) who shows
that males reward their network more.
5. Conclusions
This study sheds new light on gender differences in the art market. While most prior
studies used data on auction sales to identify potential gender gaps and thereby focused
on the top segment of the earnings hierarchy, our data allows for a more comprehensive
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analysis. We find that female artists, on average, generate fewer revenues from the art
market and are underrepresented in the highest category. As one explanation for lower
revenues, we provide evidence that females sell less to the art market. This result goes
along with a higher engagement in teaching the art and higher take-up of other income
sources like financial support by the partner.
A decomposition of the payment gaps shows that we can explain only around one-third
of the gaps by differences in observable characteristics, such as education, art field, demo-
graphics, and artistic excellence measures. Therefore, we cannot rule out that (explicit
or implicit) discrimination against female artists exists. This could relate to gatekeepers
and taste-makers in the private market, like curators, dealers, and critics, for instance.
The fact that we do not find gender inequalities when the public sector acts on the art
market supports the impression of taste-based discrimination.
Exploring the payment differences in the art market deeper, we observe that the dis-
parity is more prominent for the younger artists. We expect that there might be some
statistical discrimination on the market for the younger, less established female artists,
whereas with the experience and more established reputation, the art itself should become
more crucial than the artists’ characteristics. Moreover, we observe similar discrimination
trends in the most popular art forms in our sample.
We also provide evidence suggesting that creating a bigger network does not appear
to be the driving force behind the pay gap. We show that females tend to connect to
more people and engage more in professional interactions. However, men are more likely
to share the atelier with other artists. It suggests that males’ connections are tighter and
potentially more beneficial for performance in the art market.
There are also further factors identified in labour economics (e.g., Bertrand, 2011; Blau
and Kahn, 2017; Petrongolo, 2019) that might play in. For instance, gender differences
in competitiveness and risk-taking may serve as a further explanation of the pay gap.
With fewer regular jobs, a lower share of fixed revenues, and wider income inequalities
than in other comparable occupations (Menger, 2006), the decision to work as a full-time
artist involves a high level of risk tolerance. Furthermore, the long-standing excess supply
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of artistic labour results in a highly competitive and uncertain environment. So, if male
artists were more able to cope with these risks and competitive pressure, they may succeed
more than females.
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Table 2: Art market revenues – results from ordered logistic regressions
2013 2014 2015
female -0.452∗∗∗ -0.468∗∗∗ -0.337∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.125) (0.124)
partnership 0.166 0.218 0.216
(0.128) (0.137) (0.132)
children -0.0265 0.00287 0.00999
(0.125) (0.129) (0.129)
art education 0.0292 -0.0361 -0.0265
(0.0485) (0.0502) (0.0489)
non-art education -0.316∗∗∗ -0.367∗∗∗ -0.292∗∗
(0.122) (0.125) (0.125)
graduation 0.00133 0.0248 0.0656
(0.0896) (0.100) (0.0931)
public grants 0.309∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.124) (0.125)
prizes 0.309∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.120) (0.121)
experience w. exhibitions -0.109 -0.0371 -0.0905
(0.0670) (0.0666) (0.0667)
single exhibitions 0.207∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗
(0.0491) (0.0512) (0.0484)
group exhibitions 0.0595∗∗ 0.0632∗∗ 0.0443
(0.0273) (0.0290) (0.0283)
studio 0.785∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗ 0.577∗∗∗
(0.174) (0.172) (0.171)
recognised 1.391∗∗∗ 1.457∗∗∗ 1.410∗∗∗
(by tax authorities) (0.173) (0.183) (0.179)
art form dummies yes yes yes
location dummies yes yes yes
N 1150 1127 1125
pseudo R2 0.070 0.071 0.065
- Data: BKK survey 2016
- Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
- The number of observations varies according to differences in non-responses across variables.
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Table 3: Survival in the top income category – results from OLS and Probit regressions
OLS Probit
female -0.121∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗
(0.0198) (0.0212) (0.0187) (0.020)
demographics controls no yes no yes
education controls no yes no yes
artistic excellence controls no yes no yes
art form dummies no yes no yes
location dummies no yes no yes
N 1354 1125 1354 1125
R2 0.029 0.085
pseudo R2 0.035 0.106
- Data: BKK survey 2016.
- The dependent variable topinc is equal to 1 if the artists is in the top income category for all the years 2013 to
2016, 0 otherwise.
- Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
- For Probit estimates, the Table presents marginal effect.
- The number of observations varies according to differences in non-responses across variables.
Table 4: Public acquisition – results from OLS and Probit regressions
OLS Probit
female -0.048∗∗ -0.004 -0.048∗∗ -0.009
(0.024) (0.028) (0.024) (0.027)
demographics controls no yes no yes
education controls no yes no yes
artistic excellence controls no yes no yes
art form dummies no yes no yes
location dummies no yes no yes
N 1,224 1,033 1,224 1,033
R2 0.003 0.111
pseudo R2 0.003 0.105
- Data: BKK survey 2016.
- The dependent variable public acquisition is equal to 1 if the artists has sold their art to public authorities
at least once during the years 2013 to 2016, 0 otherwise.
- Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
- For Probit estimates, the Table presents marginal effect.
- The number of observations varies according to differences in non-responses across variables.
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female 0.184∗ 0.499∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.122) (0.032) (0.035)
demographics controls no yes no yes
education controls no yes no yes
artistic excellence controls no yes no yes
art form dummies no yes no yes
location dummies no yes no yes
N 1,329 1,233 1,289 1,183
R2 0.001 0.201 0.014 0.109
- Data: BKK survey 2016.
- The dependent variable group exhibitions is a categorical variable and is equal to 1 if the artists did not
participate in any group exhibitions, 2 if participated in up to 10 exhibitions, 3 - in up to 20, and so on,
with the maximum value of 10 for more than 100 exhibitions. The dependent variable membership is a sum
of dummies for being a member in each art organisation.
- Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
- The number of observations varies according to differences in non-responses across variables.
Table 6: Shared atelier – results from OLS and Probit regressions
OLS Probit
female -0.007 -0.041∗∗ -0.007 -0.046∗∗
(0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.023)
demographics controls no yes no yes
education controls no yes no yes
artistic excellence controls no yes no yes
art form dummies no yes no yes
location dummies no yes no yes
N 1,354 1,247 1,354 1,075
R2 0.001 0.087
pseudo R2 0.001 0.083
- Data: BKK survey 2016.
- The dependent variable shared atelier is equal to 1 if the artist is sharing the atelier with a colleague, 0
otherwise.
- Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
- For Probit estimates, the Table presents marginal effect.
- The number of observations varies according to differences in non-responses across variables.
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A. Additional Tables
Table A.1: Predicted probabilities (%) of art market revenues by year and gender
Pr[Y=1] Pr[Y=2] Pr[Y=3] Pr[Y=4] Pr[Y=5] Pr[Y=6] Pr[Y=7] Pr[Y=8]
Revenue below 1,000 to 3,000 to 5,000 to 10,000 to 20,000 to more than
category 0 1,000 3,000 5,000 10,000 20,000 50,000 50,000
2013
Men 5.0 16.7 21.5 19.4 20.0 13.5 3.1 0.8
Women 7.7 22.6 24.1 18.0 15.7 9.3 2.0 0.5
2014
Men 4.9 17.9 18.1 22.3 19.7 12.2 3.9 1.0
Women 7.6 24.5 20.5 20.8 15.3 8.3 2.5 0.6
2015
Men 6.3 16.8 20.8 20.5 18.8 11.5 3.9 1.4
Women 8.5 21.1 22.7 19.4 15.7 8.8 2.9 1.0
- Calculations based on regressions presented in Table 2.
- Probabilities changed into percentages. Every probability row adds up to 100.
- Revenue categories: All values are expressed in Euros.
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Table A.2: Art market revenues – Sample restricted to artists without children below the
age of 14.
2013 2014 2015
female -0.464∗∗∗ -0.386∗∗∗ -0.261∗
(0.142) (0.150) (0.149)
demographics controls yes yes yes
education controls yes yes yes
artistic excellence controls yes yes yes
art form dummies yes yes yes
location dummies yes yes yes
N 790 774 770
pseudo R2 0.080 0.081 0.080
- Data: BKK survey 2016
- Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
- The number of observations varies according to differences in non-responses across variables.
Table A.3: Survival in the top income category – different art forms (OLS regressions
only)
Paintings and Graphics Sculpture and Plastic Objects
female -0.132∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.026) (0.036) (0.044) (0.035) (0.038)
demographics controls no yes no yes no yes
education controls no yes no yes no yes
artistic excellence controls no yes no yes no yes
art form dummies no yes no yes no yes
location dummies no yes no yes no yes
N 960 794 417 349 415 344
R2 0.035 0.098 0.032 0.130 0.036 0.179
- Data: BKK survey 2016.
- The dependent variable topinc is equal to 1 if the artists is in the top income category for one of the years 2013 to 2016, 0 otherwise.
- Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
- The number of observations varies according to differences in non-responses across variables.
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Table A.4: Number of works sold at exhibitions during the years 2013 to 2015 – results
from ordered logistic regression
female -0.222∗∗ -0.325∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.124)
demographics controls no yes
education controls no yes
artistic excellence controls no yes
art form dummies no yes
location dummies no yes
N 1,319 1,106
pseudo R2 0.001 0.055
- Data: BKK survey 2016.
- The dependent variable workssold is classified into six categories according
to the number of works sold during the years 2013 to 2016: zero, up to
three, up to six, up to ten, up to 15, more than 15.
- Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
- The number of observations varies according to differences in non-
responses across variables.
Table A.5: Importance of colleagues nearby – results from OLS and Probit regressions
OLS Probit
female 0.166∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.031) (0.025) (0.029)
demographics controls no yes no yes
education controls no yes no yes
artistic excellence controls no yes no yes
art form dummies no yes no yes
location dummies no yes no yes
N 1,354 1,125 1,354 1,125
R2 0.029 0.111
pseudo R2 0.021 0.087
- Data: BKK survey 2016.
- The dependent variable importance of colleagues nearby is equal to 1 if the artist says that having colleagues
nearby is very important or important, 0 otherwise.
- Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
- For Probit estimates, the Table presents marginal effect.
- The number of observations varies according to differences in non-responses across variables.
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B. Additional Figures
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